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BRADLEY MARTIN THOMPSON.-For a second time within the year death has 
claimed a member of the Faculty of the Law School. Professor Jerome C. 
Knowlton died in January, and now on September 29th last, Professor Brad-
ley M. Thompson has completed his life-work. 
The Law School, until Professor Knowlton's death, had had the unique 
experience of never having lost by death a single active member of its Faculty 
in all its fifty-five years. Of course death has called not a few of the former 
members of the Faculty, but, they had previously severed their active con-
nection with the Faculty. Professor Thompson had in 1912 retired from 
active duty. He had the distinction of being a member of the first class grad-
uating from the Law School, as well as of being the oldest member of the 
Faculty, both in years and in point of service. He was perhaps known and 
endeared to a greater number of students than any man, except Professor 
Knowlton, who has ever been connected with the Law School, and "Tommy" 
as he was affectionately known and called by all who had ever been his stu-
dents, will be missed by a great number of lawyers practicing in evecy part 
of the countcy. 
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With all but one of the first group elected as editorial assistants for this 
year engaged in serving their country, it is evident that the Rr:vmw, too, must 
feel the pinch of the Great War. Every effort will be made to keep up to 
the standard of previous years. Inevitably, however, the amount of ma-
terial available for publication will be much less than in normal times. 
THE LAW SCHOOL.-The attendance has fallen off 52%. From the begin-
ning thera has been manifested a most inspiring patriotic spirit, and the fall-
ing off undoubtedly is due to a generous response to the call of the nation. 
Prophetic, perhaps, of the future, there has been a 200% increase in the 
number of young women in the Law School, there being six at the present 
time. 
During the absence of Dean Bates, who is to be at the Law School of 
Harvard University on leave of absence for one year, the administration 
of the Law School is in the hands of a committee of five: Professors God· 
dard, Lane, Wilgus, Sunderland and Holbrook. Professor Goddard acts as 
Chairman "of this committee, while Professor Holbrook succeeds to the office 
of Secretary. 
At the close of last year, Professor Bogle, who during the last ten years 
has suffered not a little from ill health, resigned. His course in Com· 
mon Law Pleading will be given by Professor Sunderland. Professor Dur-
fee has dropped Criminal Law and takes Trusts. Professor Holbrook will 
conduct the course in Criminal Law. Professor Grismore, who on the qeath 
of Professor Knowlton, last December, took Contracts, has entered the 
Army. Professor Stoner will give Contracts this year. Dean Bates' cours~ 
in Constitutional Law wm be given by Professors Goddard and Waite, the 
former for the first semester, and the latter during the second. The smaller 
number of students with the consequent reduction in number of sections has 
mad-e these changes feasible. 
Professor Thompson, who taught in the Law School from 1888 to 19n and 
who since the latter year has been Professor Emeritus, died September 29. 
PROHIBITING ADVERTISING ON WALLS AND BUILDINDS UNDER THE POLICE 
Pow:a.-There have been many unsuccessful attempts by city authorities of 
late to abolish or prevent unsightly billboards and advertising. In a recent 
case A was arrested and fined for violating a city ordmance prohibiting the 
display of advertising matter on walls and buildings within the city without 
the consent of the city council. On refusal to pay the fine A was held in 
the custody of the city marshal, and brought habeas corpus to secure his re-
lease. The court held that the affidavit charged no violation of the ordinance 
unless it were construed as prohibiting the painting of any sign on walls or 
buildings within the city, and the ordinance, if properly so construed, was 
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invalid as constituting a taking of private property for public use without com-
pensation. Anderson v. Shackelford (Fla. I9I7), 76 So. 343. 
The court in this case refuses to extend the police power to prevent offenses 
against public taste. , In this it is in accord with the consensus of opinion as 
evidenced by the decided cases, weakened by not a single dissent. Passaic v. 
Paterson Bill Posting, &c. Co., 72 N. J. L. 285, 62 Atl. 267; Bill Posting Sig1i 
Co. v. Atlantic City, 7I N. J. L. 72, 58 Atl. 342; City of Chicago v. Gmmiug 
System, 2I4 Ill. 628, 73 N. E. 1035; People v. City of Chicago, 26I Ill. I6, 
103 N. E. 6o9; People v. Murphy, I95 N. Y. I26, 88 N. E. I7. In argument 
against such limitation of the police power use has been made of the analogy 
of billboards to smoke, noise and obnoxious odors, which may be prohibited 
by ordinances enacted under the police power of a city. Rochester v. Macaitley-
Fien Milling .Co., I99 N. Y. 207, 92 N. E. 64I; Glucose Refi11ing Co. v. Chi-
cago, I38 Fed. 209; St. Paul v. Haugbro, 93 Minn. 59, IOO N. W. 470 (smoke); 
Commonwealth v. Patch, 97 Mass. 22I; Grand Rapids v. Weiden, 97 Mich. 
82, 56 N. W. 233 (obnoxious odors); Goodrich v. Busse, 247 Ill. 366, 93 N. E. 
292; New Orleans v. Fargot, n6 La. 370, 40 So. 735 (noises and unsightly 
buildings and advertising signs); FREUND, PotICE Powi>R, sec. I82. There 
are, however, two respects in which the analogy fails. First, all or nearly 
all of the cases upholding ordinances enacted under the police power to 
prohibit odors, noises and smoke, including those above cited, emphasize 
the deleterious effect of such nuisances on the health of the community, and 
there can be little doubt that these things cause actual physical discomfort 
to those offended by them and are injurious to the general health of such 
persons. Few, if any, esthetes who are offended by the sight of ugly signs 
will attribute any real physical discomfort or injury to such unsightliness. 
Second, the group of persons in any community who are offended by the 
display of inartistic advertising matter is infinitely smaller than the group 
of those who are offended by noise, bad odors and dense smoke, 
The determination of the existence of a nuisance is made to depend upon 
the presence of actual physical discomfort to persons of ordinary sensibilities, 
McGill v. Pintsch Compressing Co., I40 Iowa 429, n8 N. W. 786; Wolcott v. 
Doremus (I9r7), IOI Atl. 868, and the same test seems to have been uniform· 
ly applied by the courts where an attempt has been made to prevent -the dis· 
play of unsightly, but not immoral, advertising. The growth of civic pride 
and the education of the masses in art coupled with a more general belief in 
the intimate relation between mental contentment and physical wellbeing 
may work the desired e:i,:tension of the police power in the future to prevent 
unsightly billboards and advertisements without abandonment of.this test. 
The instant case must be distinguished from cases upholding ordinances 
prohibiting the erection of billboards of a certain kind or in certain local-
ities on the ground that they tend to encourage crime, increase the fire haz-
ard and harbor nuisances dangerous to the public health. St. Louis Gun-
ning Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, r37 S. W. 929; Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 267 
Ill. 344 ro8 N. E. 340, affirmed, 242 U. S. 526. It must also be distinguished 
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from cases declaring valid ordinances prohibiting "museums of anatomy," 
displaying models, pictures and charts of the human body, as the purpose of 
such ordinances is clearly the protection of the public morals. Chicago v. 
Shaynin, 258 Ill. 69, IOI N. E. 224. G. S. 
RIGHTS IN PERCOLATING w AT.ERS.-Almost without exception the courts ap-
prove of Acton v. Bfandell, 12 M. & W. 324 to the extent of its actual de-
cision,-that where as a result of improvement or enjoyment of one's own 
land one conducts operations which draw off percolating waters from a 
neighbor's land, even to the extent of drying up a well or spring, such in-
convenience is to be deemed dammtm absque iiijitria. The doctrine of the 
court "that the person who owns the surface may dig therein, and apply 
all that is there found to his own purposes at his free will and pleasure," 
if intend~d to be taken as broadly as stated and not limited to the facts 
then before the court, has not received such uniform support. 
In Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349, that doctrine was applied to 
a case where percolating waters were drawn off by powerful pumps, the 
water being conducted some distance away for use. And in Mayor v. Pickles 
[1895), A. C. 587, it was held that even though the abstraction was malicious 
the result should be the same .. 
On the other hand in Meek er v. East Orange, 77 N. J. L. 623, 74 Atl. 379, 
25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 465, 134 Am. St. Rep. 798, it was held that the right of an 
occupant of land as against neighbors to abstract percolating waters was not 
absolute, but relative, that the doctrine of "reasonable use" applied. About 
all there is to be said against Chasemore v. Richards was said by Chancellor 
Pitney in the New Jersey Case. The opinion contains not only a thorough 
discussion of the problem on principle but also a review of the decided cases. 
In Schenk v. City of Ann Arbor, 163 N. W. 109 (May 31, 1917), the Michi-
gan court repudiates Chasemore v. Richards, the court contenting itself with 
quoting from and following Meeker v. East Orange, supra, and Hathorn v. 
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 194 N. Y. 326, 87 N. E. 504, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
436, 128 Am. St. Rep. 555. Four justices dissented, but not on the funda-
mental question. 
One feature of Chasemore v. Richards perhaps has not been sufficiently 
emphasized. The plaintiff there was the owner and operator of a mill op-
erated by water power, developed by a stream, a part of the supply of which 
was the percolating water cut off by the defendant. The water abstracted 
had not reached the stream nor any tributary thereof-it was not stream wa-
ter any more than rain water wandering over the surface is stream water •. 
The rights of the plaintiff were those of a riparian proprietor to have a rea-
sonable use of the waters of the stream and the defendant no doubt owed 
him a duty not to make an unreasonable use of the waters of the stream. In 
truth, howev~r, the defendant had not done anything with the water of the 
stream, not any more than had the defendant in Broadbent v. Ramsbottom, 
II Ex. 6o2. 
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Percolating water is a gift of nature; like air we know not whence it 
comes nor whither it goes. If the doctrine of reasonable use is properly ap-
plied in the case of air, why should it not be good sense and good law in 
the case of water? R \V. A. 
THE RIGHT oF F!SHING.-While the man engaged in fishing is ordinarily 
more concerned with the supply of fish and their susceptibility than with his 
right to be doing what he is, not infrequently the latter question is thrust 
upon his atrention. Popular notions on this matter are not to be relied upon. 
"In country life a multitude of acts are habitually committed that are 
technically trespasses. Persons walk, catch fish, pick berries, and gather nuts 
fo alic110 solo, without strict right. Good natured owners tolerate these prac-
tices until they become annoying or injurious, and then put a stop to them,'' 
ADAMS, J., in Albright v. Cortright, 64 N. ]. L. 330. 
It would seem quite clear that a man has no right to fish where he has no 
right to be. So it is uniformly held that the public have no right to fish in a 
non-navigable, non-tidal body of water, the beds of such bodies being owned 
privately. Albright v. Cortright, supra; Baylor v. Decker, I33 Pa. St. 168; 
State v. Theriault, 70 Vt. 6I7, 4I At!. 1030, 43 L. R. A. 290, 67 Am. St. Rep. 
6g5; Hargreaves v. Diddams, L. R. IO, Q. B. 582. On the other hand it is 
equally clear that the public may fish in tidal waters. Warren v. Mathews, 
6 Mod. 73; Weston v. Sampson, 8 .Cush, 347. For this purpose the Great 
Lakes and the bays and arms thereof are treated as the sea. Lincoln v. Davis, 
53 Mich. 375, I9 N. w. I03, SI Am. Rep. no; Hogg v. Beerman, 4I Oh. St SI, 
52 Am. Rep. 71. The ~ds of the sea and the Great Lakes, it should be 
noted, are not privately owned. 
Difficulty is encountered when the body of water is non-tidal but navigable 
in fact. Confusion has been provoked by the use. in cases and books of the 
expressions "navigable water" and "tidal waters" or the "sea" as interchange-
able. So when it is said, as in Warren v. Mathews, supra, that "every subject 
of common right may fish with lawful nets, etc., in a navigable river, as 
well as in the sea," the ~tent of the right of the public to fish in a navigable 
body of water would seem quite clear. It has been held, h_owever, in Eng-
land, that there is no public right of fishing in water merely because it is · 
capable of being navigated. The right of fishing in such waters is in the 
proprietor of the bed thereof. Pearce v. Scotclzer, 9 Q. B. D. 162. In Smith 
v. Andrews [I89I], 2 Ch. 678, where the action was for trespass by fishing 
in the Thames, the court said (p. 692) : "The plaintiff's title having been 
thus challenged, she has thought it necessary or desirable to prove it from 
the earliest times. * * * It would certainly have been necessary if that por-
tion of the Thames now in question had been affected by the ebb and flow 
of the tide, as well as being navigable, for then the bed or soil of the river 
would have been in the Crown, and the right of fishing in the public, unless 
the plaintiff could have made out a valid title to the fishery based upon some 
grant by the Crown antecedent to Magna Charta." Again, on page 695, it 
was said: ''The idea is sometimes entertained that the right to pass along 
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a public navigable river carries with it the right to fish in it, but so far as 
regards non-tidal rivers this is not so. No lawyer could take that view. 
Persons using a navigable highway no more acquire thereby a right to fish 
there than persons passing along a public highway on land acquire a right 
to shoot upon it." See further Hanbury v. Jenkins [1901], 2 Ch. 401. The 
English law as to the ownership of the soil of inland lakes is not certain. At 
least the Crown does not have ownership therein, as in tidal waters, even 
though the lake is navigable. Bristow v. Cormican, 3 App. Cas. 641. And 
there is no public right of fishing in such lakes. Bloomfield v. Johnston, 8 
I. R. C. L. 68; O'Neill v. J olmsto1t [1909], I I. R. 237. 
In Lincoln v. Davis, 53 Mich. 375, where the question involved was the 
right of fishing in Thunder Bay off Lake Huron, CAMPRELL, J., said (p. 391) : 
"Such fishing as is done with lines from boats, even in narrow streams, 
cannot be complained of by riparian owners. The fish are like any other 
animals ferae naturae, and in this region have always been regarded as open 
to capture by those who have a right to be where they are captured." (Italics 
ours.) In the same case CHAMPLIN, J., said (p. 387) : "If the position is cor-
rect that the owner of land bounding on Thunder Bay has the same riparian 
rights that the owner of land bounded by a river or other stream has, then 
there can be no question as to his exclusive right to fish in the waters where 
plaintiff had attempted to, in this case, and that plaintiff was a trespasser, 
* * * for the law is well settled that riparian proprietors upon fresh water 
streams have the exclusive right of fishing in the waters opposite their 
lands." 
In accord with 'Judge CHAMPLIN'S view are Sterling v. Jackson, 6g Mich. 
488 (divided court), where the question arose over shooting ducks ; State v. 
Shannon, 36 Oh. St. 423, same; Winoies Point Shooting Club v. Bodi, 20 O. 
C. C. 637, 643, .57 Oh. St. 226; Winoies Point Shooting Club v. Slaugh-
terbeck (1917), II7 K E. 162; Hartman v. Tresise, 36 Colo. 146 (dictum, for 
apparently the river involved was non-navigable); Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 15 
Wall. 500, 512 (same); New England Trout & S. Club v. Mather, 68 Vt. 338 
(same); Schielte v. Warren, 218 Ill. 108. Contra is Willow River Club v. 
Wade, 100 Wis. 86. In Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 475, the right of fish-
ing was held to be public, the river being navigable, the court being of the 
opinion that there was no private ownership of the bed thereof. There is but 
very little real authority for the proposition that a person may lawfully fish 
in waters where for some other purpose, as navigation, he has a right to be. 
Iri Wi1wns v. Willets, et al., 163 N. W. 993 {July 30, 1917), the Michigan 
court was called upon to determine the fishing rights in one of the numerous 
small inland lakes of that state. The majority of the court being of th-e 
opinion that the lake was not a "public, navigable body of water," but a "pri-
vately owned pond," it was held that the defendants merely by reason of 
being members of the public had no right to fish there. Two Justices, FEL-
LOWS and KUHN, were of opinion that since a very small boat could be 
navigated from Lake Erie through a river and various lakes into Winans Lake, 
the body of water in question, and since the lake had been stocked with 
fish in the state, the statute, Sec. 7694, C. L. 1915, applied. That statute pro-
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vides "That in any of the navigable or meandered waters of this state where 
fish have been or hereafter may be propagated, planted or spread at the ex-
pense of the people of this state or the United States, the people shall have the 
right to catch fish with hook and line during such seasons and in such waters 
as are not otherwise prohibited by the Jaws of this state." 
It is familiar doctrine that th-a public are lawfully on one's land within 
the limits of a highway only when using the same for highway purposes. 
So it should be in the case of navigable waters, the soil of which is owned 
privately. This, as seen above, is the English Jaw, which would seem to be 
wholly sound, and it is so recognized by American courts very generally. 
Obviously fishing is not in any sense a part of navigation. In the case then 
of bodies of water, the beds of which are privately ownl!d, the fact of nav-
igability, in the absence of some controlling statute, should be immaterial. 
In the principal case there was a statute, as quoted above, on which the dis-
senting Justices relied. No question ever has been raised-in the reported 
cases-as to its constitutionality. If the right of navigation does not, at com-
mon law, include the right of fishing,-if it would be a trespass to be upon 
such navigable waters when not-engaged in navigation, a very serious question, 
it is submitted, may be made as to the po\ver of the legislature to invade 
in that way the property rights of the owner of the soil. Should the fact 
that the waters have been stocked with fish at the expense of the state or 
United States make any difference? See Albright v. Cortright, supra; State 
v. Thierault, supra; Hartman v. Tresise, supra. R. W. A. 
